ABSTRACT OS kernel is the core part of the operating system, and it plays an important role for OS resource management. A popular way to compromise OS kernel is through a kernel rootkit (i.e., malicious kernel module). Once a rootkit is loaded into the kernel space, it can carry out arbitrary malicious operations with high privilege. To defeat kernel rootkits, many approaches have been proposed in the past few years. However, existing methods suffer from some limitations: 1) most methods focus on user-mode rootkit detection; 2) some methods are limited to detect obfuscated kernel modules; and 3) some methods introduce significant performance overhead. To address these problems, we propose VKRD, a kernel rootkit detection system based on the hardware assisted virtualization technology. Compared with previous methods, VKRD can provide a transparent and an efficient execution environment for the target kernel module to reveal its run-time behavior. To select the important run-time features for training our detection models, we utilize the TF-IDF method. By combining the hardware assisted virtualization and machine learning techniques, our kernel rootkit detection solution could be potentially applied in the cloud environment. The experiments show that our system can detect windows kernel rootkits with high accuracy and moderate performance cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kernel rootkits are malicious kernel modules, and they can be dynamically loaded into the kernel space in commodity operating systems. Due to the lack of protection and isolation mechanism in the kernel space, kernel rootkits can perform various malicious operations (e.g., process hiding, sensitive information gathering) with high privilege. These kernel rootkits pose significant threat to the OS security. Most of the existing defense approaches focus on user-level threat, and they could not defeat kernel rootkits.
In recent years, more and more malware employ kernel rootkit technique to gain kernel-level privilege so that they could disable many OS protection mechanisms, and then hide their malicious activity. For example, the ZeroAccess malware [32] exploits the rootkit technique for the botnet's spread, and this malware has infected over 9 million Windows systems in 2012. Recently, the Bitdefender antivirus company
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finds that the Zacinlo malware uses a rootkit component for adware propagation in Windows 10 systems.
To detect kernel rootkits, some solutions have been proposed. Basically, these methods can be classified into two categories: static methods [14] , [20] and dynamic methods [15] , [33] . The static methods utilize static analysis to obtain the distinguishing features for classifying legitimate and malicious kernel modules. Since most of these features are related to the program semantic, the static methods require disassembling the instructions and using them to understand the functionality of the kernel module. However, if the kernel modules employ obfuscation techniques (e.g., code encryption), it will be difficult for the static analysis methods to extract their semantic features.
To deal with the obfuscation problem, the dynamic method is proposed. The basic idea of this approach is to execute a kernel module in a proper environment and then observe its run-time behaviour for later judgement. To provide the execution environment for the kernel modules, most of the existing methods employ the emulation technique (e.g., QEMU). However, these approaches suffer from three limitations. First, they introduce significant performance cost due to the emulation. Second, some malicious kernel modules can identify the underlying emulator and then change their behaviour. Third, since some kernel modules may rely on the specific hardware devices that the emulator does not support, they may not behave correctly in the emulated environment.
To address the above limitations, in this paper, we present the design and implementation of VKRD, a Virtualizationbased Kernel Rootkit Detection system. Our high-level idea is to the previous dynamic methods: we just dynamically run the target kernel module and then analyze its run-time behavior. Different from the previous emulation-based solutions, VKRD offers the target kernel module a transparent and efficient execution environment.
To make the underlying VMM be aware of the kernel module's behaviour, we leverage the stealth breakpoint technique to hook the kernel module loading. Before the target kernel module gets executed, we exploit the hardware assisted virtualization features to isolate it from the kernel space. By well manipulating the hardware assisted paging and VM control configuration, the VMM could transparently monitor the kernel module's access operations to the kernel memory and hardware registers. After analyzing these access operations, we can reconstruct the kernel module's runtime behavior. Based on the behavior information, the corresponding feature vectors are generated. For the feature selection, we take advantage of the TF-IDF (Term FrequencyInverse Document Frequency) method. With the prepared feature vectors, we leverage the supervised machine learning techniques to train the classifiers and then apply them for malicious kernel module detection.
We have implemented a prototype of VKRD based on the Xen hypervisor. The key functionality of VKRD is performed at the VMM level. For transparency, there is no agent placed inside the guest VM. To retrieve the kernel module's behavior from Out-of-VM, we utilize VMI (Virtual Machine Introspection) [9] technique.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present a kernel-level sandbox for the kernel module. By conducting the kernel memory and register isolation mechanism, our system can monitor the kernel module's run-time behavior transparently.
• We utilize the hardware assisted virtualization technology for the kernel code, kernel data, and register isolation.
To automatically obtain the unique signatures for kernel rootkit identification, we make use of the supervised machine learning techniques.
• We design and implement a prototype system based on the Xen hypervisor. The evaluation shows that our system can detect Windows kernel rootkits effectively with a moderate performance cost.
II. BACKGROUND A. KERNEL ROOTKIT
In commodity operating systems, the OS kernel and kernel modules run in the kernel mode; the user applications run in user mode. Different from user mode malware, kernel rootkits reside in the kernel mode, and they have the same privilege as the OS kernel. Due to the kernel-level privilege, the kernel rootkits can be used for hiding the user-level malware and protecting it from being stopped or deleted. To achieve the malicious purposes, most kernel rootkits need to invoke kernel API functions.
B. INTEL VIRTUALIZATION TECHNOLOGY
To facilitate x86 virtualization, Intel VT [5] introduces two new processor mode: VMX root mode and VMX non-root mode. In general, the VMM (or hypervisor) works in VMX root mode while guest VMs work in VMX non-root mode. When a specific event (e.g., executing a privileged instruction) occurs in the guest VM, a mode transition (i.e., VM exit) will take place from VMX non-root mode to VMX root mode. After the VMM handles the event, it will switch the processor mode from VMX root mode to VMX non-root mode. The CPU state of the VMM and the VM is stored in a 4-KB memory block called VMCS (Virtual Machine Control Structure). By configuring the VMCS, the VMM could select intercepting the associated operation performed by the guest VM.
III. SECURITY ASSUMPTION AND THREAT MODEL
Our method to detect kernel rootkits is based on two security assumptions. First, we assume that the OS kernel is trusted before the kernel rootkit gets executed. Second, we assume the VMM is trusted for its relative small TCB. Third, we assume both benign and malicious kernel modules are loaded into the OS kernel via the standard kernel functions. Our threat model allows attackers to load a malicious kernel module into the kernel space in the guest VM. After that, the loaded kernel module can access arbitrary memory regions and CPU registers with high privilege. However, they cannot carry out the VM escape attacks to control the trusted VM where the analyzer resides.
IV. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
The goal of VKRD is to build an online system that can detect kernel rootkits dynamically. The key idea for our detection approach is based on an observation: most of kernel rootkits' run-time behaviors differ significantly from the behaviors of benign kernel modules (e.g., device drivers). To analyze the kernel module's behavior, we leverage a hardware assisted virtualization approach. In general, the working process of VKRD is shown in Fig. 1 . First, we exploit the hardware assisted paging mechanism to isolate the target kernel module from the OS kernel. Then, our system can dynamically intercept the interaction between the kernel module and OS kernel. Moreover, to trap the hardware register access operations of the kernel module, we need to well configure the VM control structure inside VMM.
After the behavior of the kernel module is extracted, the next step is to judge whether this behavior is malicious or not. Traditional approaches perform the detection based on the behavior specification. However, it takes a lot of human efforts to generate the specification. Different from the previous methods, we take advantage of the hardware assisted virtualization to collect a set of features from the kernel module's run-time behaviors and then generate the key features for training the detection model. These features can be classified into three categories: code access operations, data access operations, and register access operations. The reason for us to choose these run-time operations as the features is based on the study of our collected kernel rootkits. To our knowledge, most of the existing kernel rootkits need to invoke kernel functions, modify kernel code (or data) and access the special hardware registers for their malicious purposes. With these features, we apply the popular supervised machine learning techniques for kernel rootkit detection.
V. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
We have developed VKRD, a prototype based on Xen [1] to demonstrate our approach. The general architecture of our system is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Before the target kernel module gets executed, we utilize the hardware assisted virtualization technology to isolate the kernel module from the kernel space. After that, the Monitor in the VMM space can intercept the kernel module's operations that try to access memory or hardware registers. To judge whether these operations are malicious or not, a detection component (i.e., Analyzer) runs in the user space of the trust VM (i.e. Dom0 VM). By utilizing the direct memory mapping technique [29] , the Analyzer can access the operation log that resides in the VMM space. To notify the Analyzer to analyze the log, we set a timer in the VMM. After that, if the Analyzer finds the set of access operations are different from the normal ones based on the trained detection model, it will raise a kernel intrusion alert in the Dom0 VM.
A. MEMORY ISOLATION
In the commodity operating systems (e.g., Windows and Linux), the kernel module and OS kernel have the same privilege and share the same memory region in the kernel space. As a result, it is a nontrivial task to isolate the kernel module's execution and then monitor its run-time behavior.
To address this challenge, we leverage the hardware assisted paging mechanism to provide an isolated execution environment for the target kernel module. More precisely, we utilize the Intel's Extended Page Table ( EPT) technology [12] , which introduces an additional memory address translation. Similar to a traditional page table, an EPT's entry contains the memory page mapping and permission bits. By well manipulating these permission bits, the VMM can ensure that the kernel module cannot directly access the memory area that does not belong to its own code and data section.
Before carrying out the memory isolation, we need to first know the memory area of the kernel module. Since this memory area is dynamically allocated by the kernel memory allocator, it cannot be pre-determined. To deal with this issue, we need to hijack the kernel module loading code so that the dynamic memory area information can be obtained. For this purpose, we make use of the stealth breakpoint technique [7] to hook the kernel function MmLoadSystemImage. To locate this function, we apply a signature-based method [23] to scan the kernel memory. Then, we set a software breakpoint on the entry of this function. After that, the VMM can intercept the invocation of the function MmLoadSystemImage. If the kernel module to be loaded is the target, our system needs to change the function's return address to an invalid address so that the VMM can trap the return operation. The reason to do so is that our system can perform the memory isolation only after the target kernel module is fully loaded into the kernel space.
When the kernel function MmLoadSystemImage returns (indicating the kernel module is already loaded), the VMM can obtain the kernel module descriptor from the stack. This descriptor contains the module base address and size information. With the module memory information, the VMM performs the memory isolation for the kernel module. By setting the different memory access permissions in the EPT, the VMM divide the original kernel address space into two separate address space. As shown in Fig. 3 , the kernel module cannot access the kernel code and data regions of the kernel module in the OS kernel address space. Thanks to the memory isolation, when the kernel module tries to access the kernel code or data, it will trigger an EPT violation that will cause a VM Exit. Then, the VMM will have a chance to log and analyze this event.
To continue the kernel module's code access operation (e.g., invoking a kernel function), the VMM should switch the address space. For this purpose, a straightforward method is to traverse the EPT tables and reset the memory access permissions. However, doing so will introduce significant performance cost. Instead, we introduce two EPTs, which have the same memory mapping but different access permissions. In this way, the VMM only needs to change the EPT base pointer, make resetting the memory permissions unnecessary. Thanks to the Intel VPID technology, the EPT change will not necessarily flush the TLB so that the performance can be further improved.
Moreover, the kernel module may access the kernel data (e.g., updating a kernel buffer). Due to the memory isolation, the data access operation will result in a VM Exit. To let this operation continue, a traditional method [27] is to recover the memory access permission and then enable the single-step mode. Since the memory isolation is temporarily removed, the data access operation can be continued. Thanks to the single-step, the VMM can regain the execution control to reset the memory access permission and then disable the single-step mode. For each kernel data access operation, the traditional method will introduce two VM Exits.
To reduce the additional VM Exit, we make use of the emulation technique to emulate the common data access operation. Specifically, we first fetch the data access instruction and then disassemble it. If the instruction semantic is common, the VMM creates a CPU emulator to interpret and execute the instruction. Next, the VMM writes the emulation results back to the processor state of the Guest CPU (i.e., VMCS). Finally, the VMM updates the program counter of the Guest CPU to skip the emulated instruction and resume the kernel module's execution. On the other hand, if the data access instruction is not common, we employ the traditional single-step method to assist the kernel module to access the kernel data.
B. REGISTER ISOLATION
In addition to accessing the kernel memory, the kernel module may also access the hardware registers. To monitor the register access operations, we take advantage of the Intel's VT technology. By well configuring the VM execution control fields in the VMCS, the VMM can intercept the access operations to the important registers that are always manipulated by kernel rootkits for malicious purposes (e.g., modifying IDT register for IDT hook). The specific configuration for the VMCS is shown in shown in Table 1 .
To monitor the write operations to the SYSENTER_EIP MSR, the VMM need to first set the 28th bit of the Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls filed to enable MSR bitmaps. Then, the VMM set the write bitmap. Similarly, to monitor the write access to the descriptor registers (i.e., IDTR/GDTR/LDTR/TR), the VMM sets the 31st bit of the Processor-Based VM-Execution Controls filed to activate secondary controls and then set the associated control filed. Additionally, the VMM configures the guest/host mask and read shadow field to trap the write operation to the WP bit of the CR0 register.
After setting the VMCS, any access operation to these registers will result in a VM Exit. By querying about the VM Exit Reason and disassemble the faulting instruction, the VMM can identify the specific type of register access. Moreover, in order to determine whether this access is actually performed by the target kernel module, the VMM needs to judge whether the faulting address is within the code memory region of the kernel module. If not, it indicates that the register access operation is conducted by other kernel component.
After inspecting the access operation attempt, the next step is to let the execution continue. Similar to handling the code/data access operation, we make use of the emulation technique and and single-step method to continue the register access operation.
C. FEATURE EXTRACTION
Thanks to the hardware assisted virtualization technology, the VMM can extract the kernel module's run-time behavior. To determine whether this behavior is malicious or not, we need to first extract a set of features from it. To overcome the semantic gap problem [4] in the virtualization environment, we leverage the virtual machine introspection technique [9] to reconstruct the operation semantic from the VM Exit events.
As shown in Fig. 4 , when a kernel module tries to access the kernel memory (or a hardware register), the operation will result in a VM Exit due to the memory (or register) isolation. Then, the VMM first checks whether the VM Exit event is caused by our isolation mechanism. If not, the VMM will deal with this event by its default handler. If it is, the VMM will exam the VM_EXIT_REASON bit of the VMCS structure to identify the VM Exit reason. If the VM Exit reason is a MSR write, it shows the kernel module attempts to modify the MSR. On the other hand, if the reason is an EPT violation, it indicates the kernel module tries to access the kernel memory. Next, the VMM will inspect the specific access type.
Due to the memory isolation, there will be two different EPT violations: EPT execute and EPT write. For the first one, it shows that the kernel module tries to invoke the kernel function (or execute the code in the kernel data memory). To locate the specific kernel function, we utilize the debugging symbols to resolve the function name. Specifically, the Windows kernel symbol file (i.e., ntoskrnl.pdb) is downloaded from Microsoft server. Then, we utilize the pdbparse tool to parse the symbol file and extract the RVAs (Relative Virtual Addresses) and function names of kernel APIs. Next, we employ the memory introspection to traverse the kernel module list to locate the kernel base address. By adding the kernel base address and RVAs, we can determine the kernel API names from the EPT execute violation addresses.
Since the kernel APIs are the key bridges between the kernel module and the OS kernel, they should be very important features for discriminating between benign and malicious kernel modules. However, based on our observations, we find some kernel APIs do not seem to be the discriminators because they appear in both benign and malicious kernel modules. To address this problem, we utilize the TF-IDF (Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency) method for the kernel API selection. This method has been widely used in the field of information retrieval to identify important words. In our study, the Term Frequency (TF) is calculated as follows:
|k(j)| where TF(i, j) denotes the frequency of the API i in the kernel module k(j), n(i, j) refers to the number of occurrences of a kernel API i in the kernel module k(j), and |k(j)| represents the total number of all the APIs in the kernel module k(j). On the other hand, the Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) is calculated as follows:
where IDF(i) describes whether the kernel API i is rare in all the dataset, |K | represents the total number of all the kernel modules in the dataset, and n(i) refers to the number of the kernel modules where the kernel API i appears. By multiplying TF with IDF, we can get the TF-IDF as follows:
TF−IDF(i, j) = TF(i, j) × IDF(i)
where TF-IDF(i,j) describes the importance of the kernel API i in the kernel module j. After computing the TF-IDF values, we can evaluate the importance of the kernel APIs in benign and malicious kernel modules. According to the importance, the Top-N kernel APIs are selected to generate the feature vectors. Given one sample, we set the eigenvalue to be the number of times that the important API appears in this sample. If the important API does not appear, the corresponding eigenvalue will be set to zero.
For the EPT write violation, it indicates the kernel module tries to modify the kernel data (or code). If the kernel data to be accessed is global, we can directly obtain the semantic by looking up debugging symbols. However, if the kernel module tries to access the dynamic kernel data, the semantic may not be directly obtained considering that the memory address of dynamic data cannot be pre-determined.
To address this problem, we leverage the memory traversal technique [3] , [6] to gather the semantic information. The basic idea of this technique is to follow the global kernel object pointers recursively to identify dynamic data. For example, by accessing the FS register, we can obtain the Kernel Processor Control Region (KPCR) structure. By further traversing one pointer field of this structure, we can get the Kernel Processor Control Block (KPRCB) structure. Since this structure contains the current thread structure (i.e., KTHREAD), it can help us calculate the address of process descriptor (i.e., EPROCESS).
It is worth noting that the VMM needs to filter some unexpected events that are not related to the kernel module's behavior. For example, the OS kernel may preempt the kernel module's execution for higher priority interrupts. To deal with this issue, the VMM should check whether the faulting address belongs to an interrupt handler routine in the IDT table. If it is, the VMM will mark this VM Exit event as unexpected.
After analyzing the VM Exit events, we can extract the semantic features as follows: 1) Code access operations: The set includes the important kernel API invocation, invoking the undocumented kernel functions that are not exported by the OS kernel, and executing the code in the kernel data regions (e.g., code packing). 2) Data access operations: These features mainly focus on the write operations to the kernel memory area. These operations include 1) modification to the kernel code (e.g., install an in-line hook to ntoskrnl.exe), 2) modification to the existing legitimate kernel module's code (e.g., Tcpip.sys), 3) modification to the kernel control data (e.g., system service descriptor table), and 4) modification to the kernel non-control data (e.g., process descriptor).
3) Register access operations: These features are mainly related to the write operations to the important hardware registers that will have direct (or indirect) effect on the kernel execution. For example, some malicious kernel modules may utilize the load IDT instruction (i.e., LIDT) to change the base address of the interrupt descriptor table (IDT), and redirect the hardware interrupt handling to the malicious one.
All these semantic features are associated with the kernel module's run-time behavior, and each of them is either a binary flag or a counter of the number. The binary flag indicates whether the related attribute is present or not, while the counter refers to the number of certain events. To normalize the counter features, we apply Min-Max normalization method so that the counter values are adjusted to 0∼1. Table 2 shows the main run-time features in detail.
D. MACHINE LEARNING-BASED DETECTION
With the set of run-time behavior features of the kernel modules, we apply the popular machine learning techniques for kernel rootkit detection. In our experiments, we leverage 4 machine learning algorithms: SVM, Decision Tree, Random Forest, and KNN.
1) SVM
The basic idea of the SVM (Support Vector Machine) is to select a small number of critical boundary points (i.e., support vectors) from each class. Based on the support vectors, the SVM learns a hyperplane that can separate two classes with maximum margin, which correspond to vectors of positive samples and negative samples. To classify an unknown sample, we just need to compute whether its vector belongs to the one specific side of the hyperplane.
2) DECISION TREE
The basic idea of the Decision Tree is to use the tree structure for making a decision. In general, the tree structure contains one root node, some leaf nodes and some internal nodes. The leaf nodes represent the classification results while other nodes refer to tests on feature properties. The decision tree has a good interpretation for the classification results.
3) RANDOM FOREST
To improve the generalization ability of decision tree, the Random Forest combines multiple decision trees and employs the voting mechanism for the final decision. It uses the bootstrapping method to randomly obtain the samples for training each decision tree. By merging all the decision results of decision trees, the overall result will be improved.
4) K NEAREST NEIGHBOR
K Nearest Neighbor (KNN) is a distance-based machine learning algorithm. The key idea of this algorithm is to find k nearest neighbors for one sample in the feature space. Based on the majority vote of these neighbors, the category of this sample is determined. Thanks to the simplicity, KNN does not need to make any assumption on the dataset distribution.
VI. EVALUATION
To test the capabilities of VKRD, we conduct perform a series of experiments on a Dell PowerEdge T310 Workstation, which is equipped with a 2.4 G Intel Xeon X3430 CPU and 4 GB memory. We implement our prototype based on the Xen hypervisor (3.4.3 version). We use Fedora 12 (linux-2.6.31) on Dom0 VM and Windows XP on DomU VM.
A. EFFECTIVENESS
To evaluate the effectiveness of our detection system, we need to first train our machine learning classifiers. For this purpose, we collect 192 kernel rootkits (from Rootkit.com, VirusShare and VX Heaven) and 208 legitimate kernel modules (from Windows OS and our lab) as the training data. In general, these rootkits employ different types of kernel techniques, including inline hooking, IDT hooking, SSDT hooking, GDT/LDT Hooking, IRP Hooking, kernel filter, and DKOM. The main malicious activities of these rootkits include modifying kernel code, modifying the key drivers, hiding a process, and injecting the malicious code into the user process. To obtain the corresponding feature set, we run each kernel rootkit/module in the training set by using the virtualization isolation. Before carrying out the run-time training for the machine learning classifiers, the clean virtualized environment files (e.g., OS image) are saved first. Then, a kernel module is executed for 5 minutes, ensuring that its run-time behavior is recorded by the underlying VMM. After that, the VMM will restore the clean virtualized environment files and run the next kernel module.
In order to achieve good performance for our classifiers, we have used a 10-fold cross-validation for the training data. After the classifiers are well trained, we apply them for unknown kernel rootkit detection. To do so, we collect additional 226 kernel rootkits and 265 legitimate kernel modules as the test data. Table 3 shows the detection results of different classifiers. The true positive rate represents the rate of correctly identified malicious kernel modules. The false positive rate refers to the rate of wrongly identified benign kernel modules when the classifier detects benign kernel modules as kernel rootkits. The true negative rate represents the rate of correctly identified benign kernel modules. The false negative rate refers to the rate of wrongly identified malicious kernel modules when the classifier fails to detect kernel rootkits.
Compared with the KNN and SVM classifiers, the Decision Tree and Random Forest classifiers have better detection results, and their overall detection accuracy can reach up to 95.11% and 96.74%. Moreover, the false positive rates and false negative rates of our trained classifiers are relatively small. For the common false positive, the main reason is that some benign kernel modules need to modify the important kernel memory and registers (or invoke sensitive kernel API functions) for their legitimate purpose. To analyze the common false negative, we manually check the target rootkit samples and find that there are mainly two causes: 1) some of them use unexpected ways to inject the malicious code into the OS kernel (e.g., utilizing their own code loader). 2) some of them do not exhibit the malicious behavior unless some specific events happen (e.g., the ioctl system call is invoked).
B. PERFORMANCE OVERHEAD
To measure the performance cost of our protection mechanism, we conduct several performance benchmarks. Firstly, we run the micro-benchmark to evaluate the performance degradation at the kernel function call level. Then, to test the application level cost, we execute a set of application benchmarks with isolating the associated kernel modules.
For the micro-benchmark, we develop a kernel module to measure the execution time of the ExAllocatePool function. Specifically, we make use of the KeQueryPerformanceCounter API function to acquire the high-resolution timestamp right before and after the function invocation that requests allocating 500 bytes nonpaged pool memory. In the native system, the ExAllocatePool function takes about 4 microseconds to complete the allocation task. In our detection system, the function needs to spend 6 microseconds to finish the operations.
To evaluate the application-level performance cost, we test some application benchmarks. For each benchmark, we isolate one related kernel module from the kernel space. To obtain the memory area of the kernel module, we leverage the virtual machine introspection technique to grab the module descriptor that contains the module base address and size information.
In the first benchmark, our target kernel module is the tcpip driver (i.e., Tcpip.sys). For this test, we first run an Apache web server on the target system. Then, we make use of the ApacheBench program to measure the transfer rate and response time of the web server. In the second benchmark, our target kernel module is the NTFS file system module (i.e., Ntfs.sys). To carry out the second test, we utilize the Winrar program to decompress the standard Linux kernel source package (i.e., linux-2.6.24.tar.gz) and then measure the decompression time.
In the third benchmark, we test the performance overhead for the isolated disk driver (i.e., Disk.sys). For this test, we leverage the xcopy tool to copy 57695KB files from a file directory to the other one. By recording the execution start time and end time, we can figure out the execution time for the copy operations. In the final benchmark, our target kernel module is a custom driver (i.e., crypt_file.sys). This driver is used for file encryption. To carry out the test, we measure the execution time for this driver to encrypt a 762 MB file by using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). To compare the add-on overhead, we also carry out these experiments in the original VM environment. Table 4 shows the results of these three application benchmarks. It can be observed that the performance cost introduced by VKRD is moderate. In general, the performance overhead depends on the frequency of kernel resource access operations performed by the kernel module. If the application VOLUME 7, 2019 requires the target kernel module accessing the kernel memory or registers frequently, the system will incur a little higher performance cost. Otherwise, the add-on overhead can be small.
To compare the performance with the recent emulationbased work, we conduct the benchmarks under DECAF's monitoring [11] that utilizes the QEMU emulator for dynamic executable code analysis. By default, DECAF focuses on capturing the system-wide information behavior of a user process. To monitor the kernel module's behavior, we develop a simple plugin for DECAF. For simplicity, this plugin just traces the important kernel API invocations of the kernel modules. Due to the software emulation, DECAF introduce significant performance overhead. In particular, it incurs more than 66% performance cost for the fourth benchmark (i.e., file copy). As Figure 5 shows, the performance overhead of our system is much smaller than that of DECAF.
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Some advanced kernel rootkits may exploit the VM-aware technique [2] to detect the hardware-assisted virtualization environment and then hide their malicious behaviour. As a result, they could bypass our detection mechanism. To deal with this problem, one potential solution is to leverage the bare-metal dynamic analysis method [13] to identify the VM-aware operations, which is abnormal for legitimate kernel modules. Some sophisticated kernel rootkits may rely on the specific events to trigger the execution. Similar to previous dynamic analysis methods, our method may not well identify this kind of kernel rootkits. Due to the memory isolation mechanism, the target kernel module may introduce considerable performance overhead when it interacts with OS kernel very frequently. To address this issue, we may make use of the new hardware feature [25] for efficient context switch without the VMM involvement. However, this solution may require some modifications to the target kernel module.
VIII. RELATED WORK A. STATIC METHOD
Kruegel et al. [14] introduce a static analysis method to detect kernel rootkits. This method utilizes the symbolic execution to identify the improper kernel memory access. Atefeh et al. [20] combine static analysis and C5 tree algorithm to identify kernel rootkits. RootkitDet [35] first utilizes static analysis on the code of rootkit samples to extract characteristic information, and then it use this information to detect typical rootkits in a cloud environment. However, the static methods are limited to detect obfuscated kernel rootkits. For example, Moser et al. [19] present a binary obfuscation scheme to fool the static analysis tool. In practice, some benign and malicious kernel modules both employ code obfuscation techniques to prevent their code being analyzed statically.
B. EMULATION-BASED METHOD
Limbo [31] utilizes a custom emulator to extract a set of behavior features for kernel rootkit detection. dAnubis [21] makes use of the generic emulation-based approach to analyze the kernel driver behavior. K-Tracer [15] leverages taint analysis to extract kernel malware behavior. By monitoring the control flow transferring between trusted and untrusted code, Rkprofiler [33] can comprehensively reveal the kernel module's behavior. Rhee et al. [24] propose a data-centric OS kernel malware characterization mechanism that can detect kernel rootkits based on the abnormal kernel data manipulation. MrKIP [30] combines emulation technique and Markov chain to recognize malware with invocation pattern of kernel functions. Since most of these dynamic methods rely on the emulation technique, it incurs significant performance cost. Moreover, the kernel rootkits may exploit the anti-emulation technique [8] to evade the detection.
C. VIRTUALIZATION-BASED METHOD
Recently, a MemoryMonRWX hypervisor [27] is developed for logging and controlling different memory access operations. This technique could be potentially used for rootkit detection. DRAKVUF leverage [17] the latest hardware virtualization extensions for dynamic malware analysis. Unlike traditional dynamic malware analysis, DRAKVUF can capture the behaviour of both user-and kernel-land malware. MOSKG [34] utilizes the virtualization technology to protect critical kernel data. Jonathan Grimm et al. [10] present a rootkit defense mechanism based on the virtualization technology. In our previous work [28] , we propose a virtualization-based protection mechanism against vulnerable kernel modules. Since most of these methods either focus on the OS kernel protection or kernel malware analysis, they may not be directly used for inspecting whether the target kernel module is malicious or not.
D. HARDWARE-BASED METHOD
To improve the monitoring performance, some hardwarebased solutions are proposed. Copilot [22] presents a coprocessor-based method to collect the memory snapshot and then verify that the kernel static region is not modified. Hyungon Moon et al. [18] utilize Snooper hardware for snoop-based kernel monitoring. Hojoon Lee et al. [16] propose a hardware-assisted event-triggered kernel monitoring mechanism. Since these approaches require the special hardware, they may not be applied in the real production environments. To address this problem, Singh et al. [26] apply the commodity HPC (Hardware Performance Counter) features for kernel rootkit detection. However, this method is limited to detect the DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation) rootkits.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented VKRD, a virtualization-based kernel rootkit detection system. Generally, the working procedure of VKRD can be divided into two steps. First, we exploit the hardware assisted virtualization to transparently isolate the target kernel module from the kernel space. Second, we utilize the underlying VMM to extract the kernel module's run-time behaviors and use them to generate the feature vectors. To select the important features for training (SVM, Decision Tree, Random forest, KNN) classifiers, we apply the TF-IDF method. Our evaluation shows that VKRD can detect kernel rootkits effectively with a moderate performance cost. 
